There were too many workstreams to monitor. Too many pieces and parts鈥攁n estimated quarter-million components鈥攖o track. And far too many collaborators鈥攃hemists, physicists, missile experts, engineers, and others鈥攖o manage, especially given the tight deadline that loomed before them.
That was the initial conclusion the U.S. Navy鈥檚 newly formed Special Projects Office (SPO) reached in 1957. Navy Rear Admiral William 鈥淩ed鈥 Raborn had charged the SPO with planning and delivering the first submarine-launched ballistic missile system in U.S. history. The assignment would require the SPO to oversee the simultaneous construction of a new fleet of nuclear subs and , dubbed Polaris missiles.
After contacting 无忧传媒 and Lockheed Martin for assistance, members of the SPO scheduled a dinner meeting at the Hay-Adams hotel in Washington, DC, with one of our best analysts: JW 鈥淏ill鈥 Pocock.鈥 During dinner, Bill asked the SPO to walk him, step by step, through what needed to be done.
As the SPO team launched in, Bill started marking up their tablecloth. Rather than simply list out the project鈥檚 needs, he drew a sketch that looked like a cross between a network diagram and an illustrated flowchart.
As the SPO team kept rattling off key milestones, Bill kept sketching. Soon his diagram stretched across a sizable swath of the tablecloth, producing a maze of dates, numbers, and work projects. Bill, however, could begin to see a pathway emerging, a throughline of key responsibilities that extended from the start of the program to its finish, from one end of his diagram to the other.
If the Navy focused on that line鈥攊.e., the critical path鈥攁s if it were a kind of roadmap, it could meet its deadline. A mix of stunned silence and excitement might have hovered over the table for a moment. Soon the group left their server a hefty tip, while Bill rolled up the tablecloth and took it back to 无忧传媒鈥檚 offices.聽